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(Abstract) 
This study examines the effect of yardstick regulation in Japan’s gas distribution sector, 
especially focusing on its effect of reducing the adverse selection problem. The Japanese 
government has regulated the price of city gas supplies by a combination of fixed-price 
regulation and ex-ante yardstick regulation. The yardstick compares a firm’s reported costs with 
those of “similar” firms before the price is determined. Realizing that yardstick inspection will 
lead the industry to a full-information outcome if it works perfectly, we infer its effect from the 
difference between the current and the counterfactual full-information welfare levels. 
We estimate the cost function of retail gas distributors under the assumption of 
asymmetric information between the regulator and the distributor in the efficient level of labor. 
The estimation allows us to obtain informational parameters such as firms’ efficiency levels and 
effort levels. Using the estimated cost structure and the firms’ behavior in response to the 
regulatory incentive, along with the demand system and the behavior of the regulator, we 
calculate the current and the hypothetical full-information welfare levels, and examine whether 
the discrepancy of the current level from the full-information one has been significantly reduced 
since the introduction of yardstick regulation. Our results suggest that, on average, yardstick 
regulation reduces welfare discrepancy, implying it is somewhat effective in reducing firms’ 
incentive to report higher costs. This effect, however, comes mainly from the very first 
inspection conducted in 1995. There seems to be a dynamic problem, similar to the Ratchet 
effect, because subsequent inspections cannot be effective for a firm that has learned the relative 
position of its own cost in the comparison group. 
 
Keywords: Adverse selection, Yardstick competition, Incentive regulation, Relative performance 
evaluation 
JEL Classification: L0, L12, L51, L95, K23 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Shleifer (1985), yardstick competition has been recognized as an 
instrument for reducing the problems of asymmetric information, namely the adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems, faced by regulators when regulating firms. This regulation has 
gained increased attention in the debate about optimal incentive structures in retail distribution. 
However, there have not been many empirical studies of such a relative performance evaluation 
despite the increased number of formal applications of this measure, and the need for further 
empirical evidence is not diminishing.12 The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate 
on yardstick regulation. The paper examines the effect of yardstick regulation in Japan’s gas 
distribution sector, especially focusing on its effect of reducing the adverse selection problem. 
 
The Japanese government (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry or METI) regulates the 
price of city gas supplies. The price of gas is determined by a type of fixed-price regulation. As 
is well known, while this type of contract has a high-powered incentive scheme to induce 
regulated firms to exert the best efforts because the firms are residual claimants, it does not have 
any truth-telling mechanisms. Presumably to improve such regulation, the METI introduced so-
called “yardstick inspection” in 1995. This inspection system compares a firm’s reported costs 
with those of “similar” firms before the price is determined. Firms that report relatively higher 
costs are subject to penalty. The reported costs are reduced and the price is determined based on 
these adjusted costs. Such a relative performance system may effectively reduce the regulator’s 
                                                    
1
 The yardstick competition has been implemented in utility industries in many countries,  such as: the 
electricity industry in the UK, Switzerland, Chile, and Germany; the water industry in the UK and Italy; 
the bus industry in Norway and so on.  
2
 As exceptions, there exist some empirical studies related to yardstick competition. For example, Farsi 
and Filippini (2004) measure the cost efficiency of electricity distribution utilities in Switzerland. Studies 
such as Antonioli and Filippini (2001) and Yatchew (2001) discuss how benchmarks should be 
constructed using the data from Italy’s water and Canada’s electricity distribution utilities, respectively. 
Dalen and Gómez-Labo (2003) investigated to what extent different types of regulatory contracts affect 
company performance in Norway’s bus industry, and found that a yardstick type of regulation 
significantly reduces operating costs. Our study differs from these previous studies in the way that it uses 
a structural model that explicitly takes into account the information problem in the regulatory 
environment. Moreover, most of the above studies focus on the discussion about firms’ incentive to 
behave in a more cost-effective manner, but not about their incentive for information revelation. Our 
study, however, focuses on the latter incentive. 
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ex-ante information disadvantage by inducing firms to compete against each others and 
eliminating firms’ incentive to report higher costs. Thus, the new regulation system, which 
combines the fixed-price contract with yardstick inspection, should effectively eliminate both 
ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard problems, the former by yardstick inspection 
and the latter by the fixed-price contract. 
 
However, several practical problems are associated with yardstick regulation. The main problem 
is the comparability between agents (see Shleifer (1985), Yatchew (2001)). For basic yardstick 
regulation to work, all distributors must produce under the same condition. This condition is 
unlikely to hold for regional monopolists such as Japanese gas distributors. The second problem 
is the possibility of firms colluding (see Shleifer (1985), Tangerås (2002) and Potters et al.  
(2004)). These problems may reduce the effectiveness of yardstick competition. Having 
recognized these problems, the objective of the study is to assess whether and to what extent the 
yardstick in the Japanese gas distribution sector works effectively. 
 
We show that, if yardstick inspection works perfectly, that is, the current industry exhibits 
desirable conditions and does not face the problems pointed out above, the current welfare level 
converges to the counterfactual full-information welfare level. On the other hand, if yardstick 
inspection does not work well, then the welfare difference should persist. The idea of this study 
is to infer the effect of yardstick inspection by the difference between the current and the full-
information welfare levels. 
 
Using firm-level panel data of local distributors, we estimate the cost function of the Japanese 
gas retail distribution sector based on Laffont and Tirole (1986). This estimation procedure was 
first introduced by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002). The estimation allows us to obtain 
informational parameters such as firms’ efficiency levels and effort levels. Using the estimated 
cost structure and the firms’ behavior in response to the regulatory incentive, along with the 
demand system and the behavior of the regulator, we calculate the current and the hypothetical 
full-information welfare levels, and examine whether the discrepancy of the current level from 
the full-information one has been significantly reduced since the introduction of yardstick 
inspection. The results suggest that, on average, yardstick inspection reduces the welfare 
discrepancy, implying it is effective in reducing firms’ incentive to report higher costs. This 
effect is, however, mainly a result of the very first inspection conducted in 1995. There seems to 
be a dynamic problem, similar to the Ratchet effect, because subsequent inspections cannot be 
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effective for a firm that has learned the relative position of its own cost in the comparison group. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature. Section 
3 describes the existing regulation in the Japanese gas distribution industry. Section 4 considers 
the application of the theory of Laffont and Tirole (1986) to the industry in order to construct 
the structural model. Section 5 presents our empirical model and estimation method, and the 
results are shown in Section 6. In Section 7, the welfare levels—current and full information—
are calculated and the welfare implications of the yardstick inspection are presented. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
 
The asymmetric information problems in the regulatory environment arise as follows. A firm’s 
cost opportunities may be high or low based on its inherent attributes. Typically, the firm has 
better information on its own cost opportunities. The firm would like to convince the regulator 
that it is a “higher cost” firm than it actually is, in the belief that the regulator will then set 
higher prices for the services it provides. Thus, the social-welfare-maximizing regulator faces a 
potential adverse selection problem as it seeks to distinguish between firms with high cost 
opportunities and firms with low cost opportunities. Furthermore, a firm’s realized costs will 
depend not only on its underlying cost opportunities but also on the behavioral decisions made 
by managers to exploit these cost opportunities. While such managerial effort will lower the 
firm’s costs, other things being equal, exerting more managerial effort imposes costs on 
managers. The regulator cannot observe managerial effort directly and thus, faces a potential 
moral hazard problem associated with variations in managerial effort in response to regulatory 
incentives. For more than 20 years, there have been many theoretical studies to find the optimal 
regulation when there is information asymmetry between a regulator and regulated firms. There 
are two strands of such literature. One uses the principal–agent framework to assess the optimal 
regulation, namely individual incentive regulation, while the other uses a relative performance 
mechanism, namely yardstick regulation. 3 
 
The representative studies on the theory of individual incentive regulation are Baron and 
Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986), both of which examine optimal regulation when 
the regulated firm has superior information about its costs. They differ in that the former focuses 
                                                    
3
 See Chong (2003) for an extensive literature review of incentive regulation. 
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on the problem of hidden information while the latter considers both hidden information and 
hidden action problems. The optimal regulation is the one that maximizes social welfare under 
the incentive compatibility and participation constraints.  
 
Yardstick regulation was first introduced by Shleifer (1985) as an incentive regulation. He 
shows that if there are multiple noncompeting but otherwise identical firms, an efficient 
regulatory mechanism involves setting the price for each firm based on the realized costs of the 
other firms. Then each individual firm has no control over the price it will be allowed to charge; 
each firm effectively has a fixed-price contract and will exert the best effort. While Shleifer 
(1985) considers the case where there is no adverse selection and where the firm’s performance 
depends deterministically on its effort, Tangerås (2002) shows that yardstick competition can 
help the regulator in compelling firms to reveal their private information. He uses the stochastic 
structure in Auriol and Laffont (1992) where firms’ adverse selection parameter iβ  is comprised 
of two parts: a common random variable m  and an idiosyncratic one iε , as follows: 
,2,1,)1( =−+= im ii εααβ  
where α is a measure of the correlation between firms, and subscript i  represents a firm. In 
Tangerås (2002), firms are first asked to submit a report on their common adverse selection 
parameter. Because the regulator can dissuade any untruthful reports, information asymmetry is 
reduced. 
 
The empirical studies that explicitly consider the asymmetric information problems in the 
regulatory environments seem to have appeared much later, possibly because there are 
unobservable variables that play a key role in the model, but for which data cannot be obtained. 
Recent empirical studies such as Wolak (1994) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) cope with such 
difficulties by using distributional assumptions on those variables. In the theory of individual 
incentive regulations, it is usually assumed that the regulator at least knows the distribution of 
the parameter responsible for the asymmetric information, and the recent empirical studies use 
this assumption directly for their estimation. Both Wolak (1994) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi 
(2002) assume that there is information asymmetry in labor inefficiency. That is, the observed 
physical labor is different from the efficient level of labor while the former determines the 
operational cost and the latter determines the output level. The studies compare the estimation 
results of the two models with different informational assumptions, one under the assumption of 
asymmetric information and the other without it, and show that the asymmetric information 
model can explain the data better. The difference between these two studies is the same as that 
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between Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986): Wolak (1994) considers the 
case of hidden information, while Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) consider both hidden 
information and hidden action problems. Another main difference is that Wolak (1994) assumes 
the optimality of the existing regulation while Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) do not. Wolak 
(1994) first presents the optimal regulation in the California water supply industry and assumes 
the firms are acting under such regulation. He then tests whether the data can be explained by 
such behavior. On the other hand, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) estimate the parameters of a cost 
function for the French transit system treating the existing regulation as given. Then, using those 
parameters, they calculate and compare the welfare levels under the existing regulation and the 
optimal regulation. 
 
3. Overview and Data 
 
In Japan, entry to the gas distribution business is regulated and therefore, to prevent the existing 
distributors from charging an inappropriate rate, the price of gas supply is regulated by the 
METI. This section provides a brief overview of the industry and associated regulation. 
 
In 2006, the Japanese gas retail distribution sector consisted of 226 firms, most of which are 
very small and local. While some distributors are partially or entirely vertically integrated, most 
of them have no significant production of their own. The large vertically integrated distributors 
import inputs such as liquefied natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas and vaporize them within 
the country. The small independent distributors generally purchase vaporized gas from such 
large integrated firms or use national natural gas in their local markets. Distribution is handled 
by both private distributors and distributors owned by prefectures or cities. There were 174 
private and 52 public distributors in 2006. They are regional monopolists and supply gas 
services in a certain area. We consider each regional monopolized market during a time period 
as a realization of a regulatory contract. 
 
We use the data of the public distributors for our analysis. While it is certainly our interest to 
analyze the private distributors, only the data of listed private distributors are available from the 
database, which is a very small portion of the entire population. Furthermore, pooling private 
and public distributors is not desirable because their size and input structure differ significantly. 
Therefore, we decided to focus on public distributors in this study. We use the gas section of 
Chiho Koei Kigyo Nenkan, which contains data on costs and production structure for all public 
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companies in Japan. Unless otherwise noted, data are taken from this source. This provides us 
with a sample of 76 public gas distributors for the period 1990–2005. 
 
Our sample can be classified into three categories according to technology. The first type does 
not have any vaporization or reformer systems and purchases vaporized gas from large 
integrated distributors or uses national natural gas. The second type includes those with 
vaporization systems. They purchase liquefied natural gas from large distributors and vaporize it 
on site. The last type owns reformer systems that enable them to convert liquefied petroleum gas 
to city gas. The gas jigyo binran states how each distributor is classified. Because of the 
technological differences, the cost structures of the three types differ significantly. For example, 
the first type incurs low input costs as vaporized gas is transported through conduits, while the 
second type transports liquefied natural gas by tank trucks, which is very costly. Therefore, for 
the purpose of homogeneity, we use only the first type of distributors for the estimation of the 
cost function. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 59 distributors for the estimation in 
the sample period. 
 
Japanese gas retail distributors need to obtain permission from the METI when they change 
price.4 Based on the expected future demand for a certain number of coming years (one year for 
the existing distributors, three years for the new distributors), price rP  is determined to satisfy 
the equation below: 
sBYCYP eer += )( ,           (1) 
where eY  is the expected demand, )( eYC  is the expected operating cost to meet the expected 
demand, s is the rate of return, and B is the rate base. Specifically, for private distributors, s is 
the weighted average of the rates of return on equity capital and liability, and B is the sum of 
operational capital and fixed assets. For public distributors, sB  is the interest expense on 
enterprise loans, temporary loans and money transferred, plus less than 2 percent of the average 
                                                    
4
  This requirement has been abolished for voluntary price reductions since 1998. Distributors are only 
required to report in the case of voluntary price reduction. (There have been, however, only two cases of 
such voluntary price reduction among our samples during the sample period. Non-voluntary price 
reduction includes those due to structural change such as calorific value change. In such cases with 
structural changes, distributors still need to obtain permission for a price reduction). Furthermore, for 
large suppliers, entry and pricing have been deregulated since 1995. Our study focuses on small supply 
services that are still under regulation. 
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of beginning and ending fixed assets. Thus sB can be considered a capital cost. Gas distributors 
report each item of the above equation and the METI investigates whether the equation holds. 
There is no ex-post inspection. 
 
This regulation scheme does not have a truth-telling mechanism if there is asymmetric 
information on the distributor’s costs.5 The distributor has an incentive to report higher costs 
because that will make the regulated price higher and the profit allowed higher.6 On the other 
hand, this regulation is the perfect mechanism to prevent moral hazard because the distributor is 
a residual claimant. Note that the regulation is different from the traditional average cost pricing 
because price is determined based on expected costs, not on realized costs. Once the price is 
determined, the distributor can obtain higher profit as they increase effort to reduce costs. That 
is, the regulation is a type of fixed-price contract. 
 
Presumably to mitigate the hidden information problem, the government introduced a so-called 
“yardstick inspection system”. The METI inspects the costs of each distributor and compares 
them with similar types of distributors. The inspection procedure is as follows. First, the 
distributors are categorized into 16 groups according to the size of markets (the number of 
households in a market), the production system, inputs, location, and owner (public or private) 
of the distributor. Figure 1 shows this grouping. Then, the distributors in each group are graded 
from 0 to 200 for their reported costs. Based on this grade, the distributors in each group are 
again categorized into three groups: I, II, and III. Distributors with lower costs go into group I. 
Distributors in groups II and III are subject to a penalty. The reported costs of the distributors in 
those two groups are reduced and prices are determined based on the adjusted costs.7 
                                                    
5
 Theoretical literature such as Lewis and Sappington (1988) assumes information asymmetry on the 
demand side. That is, they assume that the firm has better information on the demand function than the 
regulator does. Although this assumption would be worth testing, in this version of the paper, we focus on 
information asymmetry on the supply side. The METI have local offices throughout Japan and the local 
offices are responsible for inspection of local distributors. We could argue that because of these local 
offices, the METI is able to obtain good information on local demand and that there is little asymmetric 
information on demand. If information asymmetry on demand is present, suppliers may have an incentive 
to report lower expected demand. 
6
 More specifically, reporting higher costs leads to a higher (lower) regulated price if the demand 
elasticity is enough low (high) (see Section 7). 
7
 For now, the reduction rates are 0.5% for group II and 1% for group III. 
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<<Insert figure 1 about here>> 
 
Although Japanese yardstick inspection is not identical to the textbook type of yardstick 
competition, it does have its essence. If the penalty is large enough, the regulation reduces the 
incentive of firms to report higher costs (given firms in each group are actually very similar) 
because if a firm lies and others report the truth, then the firm that lied will be punished. Thus, 
the current regulation, which combines a yardstick and a fixed-price contract, theoretically 
eliminates both adverse selection and moral hazard problems: yardstick inspection removes the 
adverse selection problem while a fixed-price contract removes the moral hazard problem. In 
addition, because a yardstick system does not require the regulator to give firms an 
informational rent to tell the truth, the current regulation may indeed lead the industry to the 
full-information outcome.89 
 
In practice, however, it seems difficult for the yardstick system to work perfectly to remove the 
adverse selection problem. First, it has often been discussed that the regulator is unlikely to find 
a large set of truly identical firms. In this Japanese system, distributors cannot be identical even 
in the same group. Second, again as an often-discussed point, firms may collude. Third, the 
current penalty seems to be ad hoc. It is unclear if it is sufficiently high to induce truth telling. 
Furthermore, here, the extent of the punishment depends only on the order of the costs, not on 
the difference in the costs. This may also reduce the effectiveness of the regulation. 
 
Because yardstick inspection is unlikely to work perfectly, we do not assume optimality of the 
current regulation. Therefore, our estimation follows Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) rather than 
Wolak (1994). This estimation requires only ex-post realized data and we do not have to model 
the firms’ ex-ante behavior under yardstick inspection. This suits us because we are not sure to 
what extent the Japanese yardstick is effective and therefore, how the firms behave under such 
regulation: we cannot model ex-ante behavior of the firms. As described before, we infer such 
ex-ante behavior of firms, truth telling or not, by the welfare difference. 
                                                    
8
 With an individual incentive regulation, the regulator cannot achieve the full-information outcome 
because it needs to give informational rents to firms, and usually such rents are costly.  
9
 We mean, by full-information outcome, the counterfactual outcome that can be achieved if the regulator 
does not face the information disadvantage. This differs from the often-discussed first best outcome 
because the regulator here is not a welfare maximizer.  See Section 7 for the discussion of the Japanese 
regulator’s objective. 
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All the gas distribution companies were surveyed in the first yardstick inspection in 1995. They 
were required to provide values for the variables in equation (1), regardless of whether they 
were willing to change their current prices. Following the first inspection, only the distributors 
that applied for a price change are subject to yardstick inspection. Among our sample of 59 
distributors, there were 14 applications for price changes subject to the yardstick after 1995, one 
each in 2000 and 2003, two in 2001, four in 2004, and six in 2005. When only the distributors 
that applied for a price change are inspected, the latest reported costs of firms that did not apply 
for a price change (they did not report current costs) are used as a benchmark. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average unit price of public firms over 1990–2005. The prices of public 
firms have a downward trend after the introduction of yardstick inspection. There is a large drop 
in prices in 1996, following the introduction of yardstick inspection.  
 
<<Insert figure 2 about here>> 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
 
In this section, we consider a model of retail gas distribution services, which is still under price 
regulation.10 To derive a structural model of the industry, we need a detailed account of the 
technological, informational, and regulatory constraints. We start this section by describing our 
assumptions on these constraints. 
 
For the technological constraint, we assume that, to provide the required level of services, 
denoted by Y, the gas distributor needs to combine four inputs: labor (L), gas (G), materials (M), 
and capital (K). L includes all types of workers; G corresponds to gas inputs for distribution; K 
refers to plant, infrastructure, and distribution networks; and M includes all materials used for 
performing maintenance and management activities. The distribution process is then represented 
as: 
),,,( bKMGLfY = ,                 (2) 
where b is a vector of parameters characterizing the technology in the production process. 
 
                                                    
10
 As noted, prices for large supply services were deregulated in 1995. 
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Regarding informational and regulatory constraints, we follow the assumptions of Gagnepain 
and Ivaldi (2002) (henceforth G&I). First, the gas distributor has private information about its 
technology and its cost-reducing effort is unobserved by the authority. We assume that the 
distributor is better informed about input efficiency than the regulator is. More specifically, we 
distinguish between the observed and the efficient levels of labor and assume that the distributor 
is better informed about labor efficiency. 11  Second, regulatory schemes and distributors’ 
efficiency levels are exogenous.12 
 
Let Lˆ  be the physical amount of labor that is observable by the authority. L is the efficient level 
of labor associated with the output level Y. We assume that the ratio of observed to efficient 
labor quantities is a direct measure of informational discrepancies between the regulator and the 
distributors. Following G&I: 
)exp(ˆ eLL −= θ .     (3) 
Parameterθ, the so-called “labor inefficiency parameter”, refers to variables that are not under 
the control of the distributor. As θ becomes larger, the efficient level of labor is smaller given 
the observed physical amount of labor. The variable e summarizes the behavioral decisions 
made by managers to exploit the opportunities; e defines the effort level of managers. As e 
increases, the discrepancy between L  and Lˆ  decreases. The distributors cannot change their 
types,θ, but can change the level of discrepancy between L  and Lˆ  by increasing the effort level 
e. If the distributor sets the effort level so that θ=e , then the observed level and efficient level 
coincide. 13 Both input inefficiency and cost-reducing activity are unobservable to the regulator 
and to the econometrician. The efficient level of labor L  determines the output level while costs 
are incurred to cover physical labor Lˆ . 
                                                    
11
 For analytical simplicity, we assume that only one input is affected by this inefficiency although in 
reality all of the four inputs may be inefficient. Appraising efficiency by the observed quantity of physical 
input is more difficult in the case of labor and choosing labor input for the setting seems to be appropriate. 
12
 The assumption that the efficiency parameter is independent of time is debatable. This implies that 
contracts are renewed each year independently of what the state of nature was in the past. In a dynamic 
setting, inefficiency could evolve, and its evolution could be approximated by a trend. (See Cornwell, 
Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) for such a model.) 
13
 We assume that θ is always greater than e. As Gagnepain and Ivaldi stated, this assumption is 
meaningful in the sense that the managers’ effort is aimed at reducing the inefficiency level, which cannot 
be larger than θ. 
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Next, we interpret the distributors’ decision process after the price is set. The decision process 
consists of choosing the optimal input and effort allocation. Note that this is an ex-post behavior 
and does not involve an ex-ante decision process, such as which level of costs to report, under 
the yardstick regulatory environment. We decompose this ex-post decision process into two 
steps. The first step is to choose the optimal input and the second is to choose the optimal effort 
allocation, given the regulated price and the demand associated with the price. 
 
Assuming that the distributor is a price-taker in the market for input factors and has a cost-
minimizing behavior for each level of effort, an operating cost function can represent the 
technological process. The operating cost faced by the distributor is: 
MGLC MGL ωωω ++= ˆ , 
where ],,[ MGL ωωωω =  are the prices of labor, gas, and materials, respectively. We assume that 
K cannot be fully adjusted in the short run and is fixed. 14 From duality theory, the conditional 
operating cost function is defined by: 
MGeLeKYC MGLMGL ωωθωβθω ++−= )exp(min),,,,( ,, ,  (4) 
subject to: 
).,,,( bKMGLfY =  
Equation (4) defines a “conditional” operating cost function because it still contains a level of 
effort. This is the first step in the distributors’ decision process. 
 
The second step is to determine the level of cost-reducing activity under the given regulatory 
environment. As seen in the previous section, the Japanese authority sets the price of gas 
services so that it equals the expected average cost (see equation 1). There is no ex-post 
inspection to check whether the reported cost is actually equal to the realized cost. Under this 
fixed-price regulation, the distributor is the residual claimant of effort. After the activity in the 
contractual period, all the realized profit goes to the distributor. The utility of the firm is given 
by: 
),(),,,,()( esBeKYCYYPU ψβθω −−−=    (5) 
where )(eψ  is the cost of effort function; exhibiting effort is costly for the firm. The distributor 
                                                    
14
 We also assume that the capital cost sB  is fixed in the short term and therefore it is included not in the 
operating costs but in the total cost. 
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maximizes utility in equation (5) with respect to the effort level, e , and the first-order condition 
is: 
eCe ∂−∂= /)('ψ ,          (6) 
which implies that the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal cost saving from the effort. 
 
5. Empirical Model 
 
5.1 Functional forms 
We choose a simple Cobb–Douglas function to represent technology for the following reasons. 
First, we use it for tractability. Although we could have used more elaborate functional forms 
such as a translog for the estimation of the cost function, computations of welfare become 
cumbersome with such functions. Second, because of the choice of the Cobb–Douglas function, 
the two-step decision process above (the input allocation and effort level determination 
problems) provides the same solution as if we had solved the two steps simultaneously. Under 
Cobb–Douglas technology, the dual cost function is given by: 
YKMGL YKeC MGLL
βββββ ωωωθββ )](exp[0 −= ,   (7) 
with the assumption of homogeneity of degree one in input prices, that is 1=++ MGL βββ . We 
should note that no constraint is imposed on the return to scale effect. As in previous studies, we 
specify the cost of effort by: 
1)exp()( −= ee αψ ,                (8) 
with α > 0. 
 
Using these functional forms and the first-order condition (6), we can solve for the effort level 
as: 
.
lnlnlnlnlnlnln 0*
L
YKMMGGLLLL YKe βα
ββωβωβωβαββθβ
+
+++++−+
=  (9) 
From the equation above, we can see that the equilibrium effort level under this regulation 
regime is an increasing function in the inefficiency parameter θ, the output level Y, and the input 
prices ,, GL ωω  and Mω . A distributor with the larger θ (less efficient distributor) needs to make 
a greater effort under this regulatory scheme. Moreover, *e  is a decreasing function of α, the 
technological parameter of the internal cost function (8). 
 
Substituting the optimal effort level *e  into the cost function (7) and taking the logarithm, we 
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obtain the cost function as follows: 
)lnlnlnlnln(ln 0' YKC YKGGMMLLL ββωβωβωβθβξβ ++++++= ,        (10) 
where )/( Lβααξ +=  and )./()lnln(lnln 00'0 LLL βαββαβββ +−−+=  
 
5.2 Estimation method and data 
The key feature of G&I lies in the way a stochastic element is built into the classical Cobb–
Douglas cost function through the efficiency parameter. Assuming that parameter θ has a 
density function )(θf  defined over an interval ],[ θθ , where θ  (θ  respectively) corresponds to 
the most (least) efficient firm, provides us with the stochastic element required to perform the 
estimation. 
 
Using equation (10), the stochastic cost function for distributor i  at period t  is given as: 
c
ititititit
c
itYKMMGGLLLit
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εβθω
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+++++++=
),,,(
)lnlnlnlnln('0
      (11) 
where Ccit ln=  and an error term it
cε  is added to account for potential measurement errors. It 
is assumed to have a normal density with mean zero and variance c2σ , and they are independent 
of each other. Moreover, we use a beta density function for )(θf , the distribution of the 
efficiency index θ , with scale parameters µ and ν. It is reasonable to choose this distribution for 
θ  because the shape of the beta distribution is flexible depending on the scale parameters. 
Furthermore, G&I sets out two additional advantages of using the beta density function. First, 
the beta density function is defined over the interval [0,1] and therefore, the labor inefficiency 
parameter is defined as a percentage. Second, we need a density function defined on a compact 
support and the beta density function gives us this condition. 
 
The conditional likelihood of iθ  is: 
,
1),,,,,,,|()(





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
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c
c
it
c
ciitititititit KYcLL θσ
εφ
σ
νµσβθωθ    (12) 
where (.)φ  denotes the normal density function. However, because the variable iθ  is 
unobservable, only the unconditional likelihood can be computed, that is: 
∫ ΓΓ
+Γ
−=
−
−
1
0
11
,)()(
)()1()( iiiiitit duuuuLL µν
µνµν
   (13) 
where Γ(.) is the gamma function. 
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The sample consists of 76 public gas distributors for the period 1990–2005. As described in 
Section 3, the sample can be categorized into three types according to their technology. For the 
cost estimation, we use 59 distributors of Type 1 for the purpose of homogeneity. Estimating the 
Cobb–Douglas cost function requires measures of the level of operating costs, the quantity of 
output, and the input prices. The output is specified as total volume (m³) of gas supplied by 
distributors. The total length of the conduit (m) is used for the quantity of capital. Costs of labor 
are specified as total labor expenditures including wages, salaries, pensions, and benefits. The 
price of labor is calculated as labor costs divided by the number of employees. Costs of 
materials are specified as nonpersonnel expenses for day-to-day operations and maintenance of 
the distribution network. The price of materials is calculated as the costs of materials divided by 
the number of meters (that is, the number of households that have access to the gas supply 
service) in each market. Because the costs of materials mostly arise from operating and 
maintaining distribution lines to households, the number of households seems to be a suitable 
measure of material inputs. Costs of gas input are specified as total expenditure on raw material 
inputs. The price of gas is calculated as the costs of gas divided by the total amount of gas used 
for distribution. 
 
For welfare analysis, we estimate the demand function in Section 7. We use all 76 samples for 
the demand estimation. This estimation additionally requires measures of consumer prices. We 
use the calorific value-adjusted price (yen/10,000 kcal) as the price measure. Furthermore, 
welfare calculation requires the capital cost, sB  in equation (1). Capital cost is specified as 
interest expenses on enterprise loans, temporary loans, and money transferred plus 2 percent of 
the average of the beginning and ending fixed assets. 
 
Summary statistics of the variables categorized according to their technology types are given in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 2 compares the average operating costs and prices before and after the introduction of 
yardstick inspection. We can see from the last row that, in our sample, both the mean average 
operating cost and the mean price decreased after the introduction of yardstick competition. 
These changes are statistically significant. The standard deviations of costs and prices also 
decreased after the introduction of yardstick inspection, although the latter is statistically 
insignificant. We examine these statistics in each group of the yardstick inspection; however, 
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some groups show different changes. In group 15, the mean of prices increased, despite a 
decrease in the mean of costs, after the introduction of yardstick inspection. In groups 12 and 15, 
the standard deviations of prices increased after the introduction of yardstick competition. 
Furthermore, Table 2 compares the mean growth rates of average cost before and after the 
introduction of yardstick inspection. We can see from the last row that, in our sample, the 
average operating costs were decreasing in the sample period. These decreases are not 
significantly different between the two periods at 5 percent level. In group 14, however, average 
operating costs were increasing before the introduction of yardstick inspection, while they were 
decreasing afterward. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
 
6.1 Estimation results of cost function 
The estimated parameter values for equation (11) are reported in Table 3. Because we assumed 
homogeneity, the parameter for Mβ  is dropped. To capture the time trend, we add a year dummy 
to equation (11), and tβ  denotes its coefficient. 
 
All parameters are significant at least 10 percent level, except α and tβ . In particular, this is true 
for the scale parameters µ and ν characterizing the density of the inefficiency level. From the 
estimated µ and ν, it turns out that the density function is a decreasing function. More than 70 
percent of the distributors have a θ  of less than 0.5. 
 
Along with the above model, we also estimate the alternative model. The alternative model is a 
Cobb–Douglas cost function that does not take into account regulatory and informational 
constraints. This model is referred to as the standard case, namely: 
.lnlnlnlnlnlnln
,,,0
c
ittitKitYitGGitMMitLLiit YearKYC εβββωβωβωββ +++++++= (14) 
The standard case includes a time trend and a firm effect i0β  to allow for a fixed-effect 
estimation procedure. To compare the fit of the two models, we conducted a Vuong (1989) test 
whose null hypothesis is that the two models are equally far from the true data-generating 
process in terms of Kullback–Liebler distances. The alternative hypothesis is that one of the two 
models is closer to the true data-generating process. We obtain a Vuong statistic of 2.67. This 
statistically supports the asymmetric information model generated by the structural approach 
rather than the standard model. 
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6.2 Efficiency and effort levels 
Estimates of individual efficiency parameters can also be recovered. From equations (10) and 
(11), the error term of the cost function has two unobservable, random, and independent 
components, iθ  and
c
itε . The error term can be written as: 
iL
c
ititu θξβε += , 
where )/( Lβααξ += . From a procedure by Jondrow et al. (1982), we recover an estimate for 
each iθˆ  from the values of residuals ituˆ  by considering the conditional distribution of iθ  given 
itu , that is, by computing )|(ˆ ititi uE θθ = . For all distributors in our data set, the estimated 
values of the efficiency levels are available from the authors. Once the estimate for iθ  is 
obtained, we can then also obtain the effort level using equation (9). 
 
From equation (7), the cost distortion that measures the discrepancy between the theoretical 
frontier and the observed cost is given by: 
)](exp[ eL −θβ .     (15) 
The maximum cost distortion is achieved for a zero level of effort and an inefficiency level 
equal to one. Figure 3 presents our set of distributors in 1996 ranked according to their cost 
distortions defined by equation (15). In addition, Figure 3 provides the level of the inefficiency 
parameter for each distributor. Reflecting the high efficiency levels and the high-powered 
incentive regulatory scheme (that is, fixed-price contract), the distortion is not very high. The 
maximum distortion is about 10.1 percent, and most of the distributors exhibit a distortion level 
of less than 5 percent. 
 
<<Insert figure 3 about here>> 
 
7. Welfare Implications and the Effect of Yardstick Inspection 
 
7.1 Demand 
Our objective is now to perform a comparison of current and full-information welfare. First, to 
compute consumer surplus, the price elasticity of demand must be estimated. 
 
Assume the demand function is log linear such that: 
dtdPddY ε+++= 210 lnln ,                       (16) 
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where a vector 0d  includes the fixed effects and t is a year dummy. Our model of costs and the 
demand systems is sequential. First, the government sets a price and once the price is known, 
the demand level is determined according to equation (16). Finally, the cost of running the 
service is obtained through the cost model given by equation (10). This gives rise to a block-
recursive structure, so each equation can be estimated separately. We obtained the estimated 
results of price elasticity 0.275. See Table 4 for the results.  
 
7.2 Regulator’s behavior 
We now know the cost structure, the demand elasticity, the inefficiency level, the effort function, 
and the price level. Additionally, the behavior of the regulator must be specified. Here, we 
consider the regulator’s pricing behavior, ignoring the existence of the yardstick regulation for 
now. As noted in Section 3, the regulation requires the price to be equal to an expected average 
cost as in equation (1): eer YsBYCP /))(( += . Therefore, we assume that the regulator’s 
objective is to set the price equal to the average cost such that: 
sBYCYP r += )( ,     (17) 
where Y is the realized output level.15 Given the selected price is a point on the inverse demand 
function, (.)P , when the authority has set the price, the associated demand Y  is implicitly 
determined, that is, the customers adjust their demand at this price. The regulator should take 
this into account and therefore, equation (17) can be rewritten as: 
sBeKYC
sBYCYYP
+=
+=
),,,,(
)()(
βθω             (18) 
where the cost function in equation (4) is substituted. The regulator’s problem is to find the 
demand level Y  that satisfies the equation above, given ,,,,, βθω eK  and sB . 
 
We assume that the regulator observes all the variables and the parameters in the above equation 
except θ  and e. Actually, however, from equation (9), once the level of Y  is determined, the 
level of effort can be recovered if θ  is recovered: )|,,,(* βθωKYee = . The regulator is 
assumed to know this structure of the industry and therefore, the only unobservable for the 
                                                    
15
 Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) assume that the regulator is a welfare maximizer, given the regulatory 
environment. However, because it is not welfare maximizing to set the price to be equal to the average 
cost, we do not assume it here. Therefore, our full-information welfare is different from the first-best 
welfare unlike often discussed, and the current welfare may be larger than the full-information welfare.  
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regulator is θ . 
 
Given the above assumptions, the regulatory environment is reduced to the following. First, the 
distributor reports the levels of θω,,K  and sB , and the regulator sets the level of output so that 
equation (18) holds, given the reported levels. Because sBK ,  and ω  are observed by the 
regulator, we assume that the distributor reports the true levels of these variables; they are the 
same as the observed data. On the other hand, because the regulator does not observe the level 
of θ , we distinguish the true level of θ  from the reported level θˆ . We assume that the 
regulator believes that θθ =ˆ . Given the reported inefficiency level θˆ , the regulated output level 
rY  is determined so that: 
sBYKKYe
sBKYeKYCYYP
YKMGL r
MGL
r
L
rrrr
+−=
+=
βββββ ωωωβθωθββ
βθβθωω
))]|ˆ,,,(ˆ(exp[
)|ˆ),|ˆ,,,(,,,()(
*
0
*
 (19) 
where .lnlnlnlnlnlnln
ˆ
)|ˆ,,,( 0*
L
r
YKMMGGLLLLr YKKYe βα
ββωβωβωβαββθββθω
+
+++++−+
=  
We can see that the regulated output level can be expressed as a function of the reported 
inefficiency level: )ˆ(θYY r = . 
 
7.3 Ex-post distributor’s behavior 
Once the regulated output level )ˆ(θYY r =  is determined, the distributor conducts cost-
minimization activity (4) given )ˆ(θY  and for each level of effort e , and the cost function is 
described as a function of both θ  and θˆ , namely: 
YKMGL YKeeYC MGLL
βββββ θωωωθββθθ )ˆ()](exp[)|)ˆ(,( 0 −= .   (20) 
Similarly, the distributor next maximizes utility with respect to the effort level given the 
regulated output level )ˆ(θY , and the first-order condition (9) gives us the effort level as a 
function of both θ  and θˆ , namely: 
.
)ˆ(lnlnlnlnlnlnln))ˆ(,( 0*
L
YKMMGGLLLL YKYe βα
θββωβωβωβαββθβθθ
+
+++++−+
=  (21) 
Therefore, the cost realization will be as the following,  
YKMGL YKYeYeYC MGLL
βββββ θωωωθθθββθθθθ )ˆ()))]ˆ(,((exp[)))ˆ(,(),ˆ(,( *0* −=   (22) 
 
7.4 Welfare implications 
Given our knowledge of the demand and supply functions, we now calculate the welfare levels 
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under the current and the hypothetical full-information situations to see whether the introduction 
of yardstick inspection reduces the information disadvantage of the regulator. Full-information 
welfare is obtained by assuming the regulator observes all the variables and parameters. 
 
We define social welfare as: 
URSW +−=      (23) 
where S is the gross surplus and derived from the demand function, R is the distributor’s 
revenue and obtained as the product of the price and the demand level, and U is the firm’s utility 
defined in equation (4). 
 
Substituting (21) and (22), the current (actual) welfare level cW  can be expressed, given the 
reported inefficiency level θˆ  and the true inefficiency level θ , as follows: 
)))]ˆ(,(()))ˆ(,(),ˆ(,()ˆ())ˆ(([)ˆ())ˆ(())ˆ(()ˆ,( ** θθψθθθθθθθθθθθ YesBYeYCYYPYYPYSW c −−−+−=  (24) 
This can be calculated by using the observed output level for )ˆ(θY  and the inefficiency level θ  
recovered in Subsection 6.2. The full-information welfare level fW , which can be obtained if a 
distributor reports the true inefficiency level θ , that is, if θθ =ˆ , is: 
)))](,(()))(,(),(,()())(([)())(())((
),(
** θθψθθθθθθθθθ
θθ
YesBYeYCYYPYYPYS
WW cf
−−−+−=
=
 (25) 
 
The problem with the fixed-price contract is that it does not have any truth-telling mechanism. 
Therefore, the distributors may have an incentive to report θˆ , which is higher than the true level 
θ , to obtain a higher permitted profit. Such a behavior either decreases or increases social 
welfare away from the full-information welfare.16 Appendix A shows that reporting a higher 
inefficiency level θˆ  leads to a higher (lower) regulated price and lower (higher) output if the 
slope of the inverse demand curve is smaller (larger) than the average cost curve. It turns out 
that with our estimated parameter values, all our observed markets exhibit a smaller slope of the 
inverse demand curve than that of the average cost curve. Figure 4 describes this situation. In 
Figure 4, θAC is the true average cost curve of a firm with inefficiency level θ , and θˆAC is the 
false average cost curve the regulator believes that the firm has when the firm reports θˆ  such 
                                                    
16
 As noted, the full-information welfare is different from the often-discussed first best welfare. Therefore, 
the current welfare can be higher than the full-information welfare.  
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that θθ ˆ< . That is: 
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)(YP  is the inverse demand function. In the full-information case, price is determined so that 
θACP = . This price and the associated demand are shown by )(θP  and )(θY , respectively, in 
Figure 4. However, if the firm reports a higher θˆ , price and output are determined at the levels 
of )ˆ(θP  and )ˆ(θY  in Figure 4. In such a case, the firm’s true average cost is ))ˆ(( θθ YAC  given 
the regulated output level )ˆ(θY . The firm’s profit increases from zero in the full-information 
case to the area ))ˆ(()ˆ( θθ YadACP . The firm’s utility also increases, because the effort level 
decreases because of the lower output. Consumer surplus decreases because of a higher price 
and lower output. 
 
<<Insert figure 4 about here>> 
 
The introduction of yardstick inspection may reduce the incentive to report a higher θˆ , because 
if a distributor reports a higher inefficiency level than the other distributors in the same group, it 
is subject to penalty. In the next subsection, we show that if the yardstick inspection actually 
reduces the discrepancy between θ  andθˆ , the difference between cW  in equation (24) and fW  
in equation (25) should also decrease. We assess whether the introduction of yardstick 
inspection actually reduces the discrepancy between θ  and θˆ  by examining whether the 
discrepancy between cW  and fW  has been reduced since its introduction. 
 
7.5 The effect of yardstick inspection 
The very first yardstick inspection was conducted in 1995. Under this first inspection, all gas 
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distributors were required to report values of the variables in equation (1), regardless of whether 
they were willing to change their current prices at the time. Since the first inspection, only 
distributors that apply for a price change have been subject to yardstick inspection. Among our 
sample of 59 distributors, there were 14 applications for price changes that were subject to the 
yardstick after 1995, one each in 2000 and 2003, two in 2001, four in 2004, and six in 2005. 
 
We call the first inspection, in which all the distributors are targets, the “simultaneous yardstick 
inspection” and the subsequent cases, in which the distributor that applied for a price change is 
the target, as the “individual yardstick inspection”. We examine the difference between full-
information welfare fW  in equation (25) and current welfare cW  in equation (24) or 
cf WWW −=∆ , with and without yardstick inspection. Equations (24) and (25) show that as a 
reported inefficiency level converges to the true inefficiency level, the welfare difference 
converges to zero. That is, as ,ˆ θθ →  fc WW →  and 0→∆W . Furthermore, Appendix B 
shows that with our parameter estimates, current welfare )ˆ,( θθcW is a monotonically 
decreasing function of θˆ . Therefore, the welfare difference cf WWW −=∆  is always positive 
(when θθ >ˆ ) and an increasing function of θˆ . Therefore, if yardstick inspection has the effect 
of reducing firms’ incentive to report higher inefficiency levels (that is, if yardstick inspection 
has the effect of reducing the discrepancy between θ  and θˆ ), it reduces W∆ . 
 
We examine several measures of the effect of yardstick inspection, which are expected to take a 
negative value if yardstick inspection has the effect of reducing firms’ incentive to report higher 
inefficiency levels. Now, let R be the indicator variable such that 1=itR  if distributor i  is 
subject to yardstick inspection in year t and 0=itR  otherwise. Also, let I  be the indicator 
variable such that 1=itI  if distributor i  applied for a price change and obtained permission in 
year t and 0=itI  otherwise. That is, when 0=itI , a distributor preferred the status quo. Our 
first measure of the yardstick effect is: 
][ iiave DiffEEffect = ,     (26) 
where ]1&0|[]1|[ ==∆−=∆= itititititi IRWERWEDiff  for each i . This is a simple average 
difference in the welfare disparity with and without yardstick inspection. Next, we examine the 
effect of simultaneous yardstick inspection: 
][
,isimisim DiffEEffect = ,     (27) 
where ]1&0|[]1995&1|[
,
==∆−==∆= itititititisim IRWEtRWEDiff  for each i . This is an 
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average difference in the welfare disparity with and without simultaneous yardstick inspection. 
Next, we examine the effect of individual yardstick inspection: 
][
,iindiind DiffEEffect = ,     (28) 
where ]1&0|[]1995&1|[
,
==∆−≠=∆= itititititiind IRWEtRWEDiff  for each i . 
 
The results are shown in Table 5. We calculate both per-household welfare and total market 
welfare in each market and calculate the measures of improvement in welfare disparity defined 
above. The negative values imply that yardstick inspection reduced the adverse selection 
problem. The first row of Table 5 shows the measure defined in equation (26). We can see that, 
on average, yardstick inspection improved the per-household welfare disparity. On average, the 
per-household welfare disparity from the full-information outcome is 26.40 yen smaller under 
yardstick inspection. The second row shows the measure defined in equation (27). Again, we 
can see that the per-household welfare disparity is 127.51 yen smaller under yardstick 
inspection. This implies that the simultaneous yardstick inspection in 1995 was somewhat 
effective in reducing adverse selection. Measures (26) and (27) calculated with total market 
welfare, however, show that welfare disparity was widened by yardstick inspection. Total 
market welfare disparity is 5,604,000 yen larger under yardstick inspection. It is 3,367,000 yen 
larger under simultaneous yardstick inspection. The result that per-household welfare disparity 
was improved while total market welfare disparity was not may imply that simultaneous 
yardstick inspection was effective only for firms in small markets. Because our estimated cost 
function exhibits scale economies, firms in large markets have a cost advantage. Therefore, our 
results suggest that the simultaneous yardstick inspection was effective only for firms without a 
cost advantage in reducing the adverse selection problem: firms with a cost advantage still have 
incentive to report higher costs even under yardstick inspection, while firms without a cost 
advantage have a lower incentive to report higher costs. One possible reason for such a 
phenomenon is that firms are not identical in the yardstick comparison groups. Yardstick 
grouping may not be appropriate here, and such a grouping may reduce the effect of yardstick 
inspection. 
 
The measure of the effect of independent yardstick inspections defined in equation (28) shows a 
different result. On average, it can be seen from the third row that the individual yardstick 
inspection widened both per-household and total market welfare disparities. The per-household 
and total market welfare disparities widened, by 647.11 yen and 23,700,000 yen, respectively. 
This implies that subsequent individual yardstick inspections do not always have the power to 
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reduce the adverse selection problem. Why might an individual case not work? One possible 
reason is that, in such an individual case, the benchmark costs are already known for the firms 
from the first inspection in 1995. Therefore, our results may give rise to a dynamic concern, 
similar to the Ratchet effect, because the subsequent inspection cannot be effective for a firm 
that has learned the relative position of its costs. 
 
Finally, we calculate the additional two measures. The first measure simply looks at the average 
difference in the welfare disparity before and after the introduction of yardstick inspection, 
regardless of whether or not the firm is subject to yardstick inspection. Namely: 
][
,// iafterbeforeiafterbefore DiffEEffect = ,   (30) 
where ]1995|[]1995|[
,/ >∆−≤∆= tWEtWEDiff ititiafterbeofer  for each i . The second measure 
looks at the average difference in the welfare disparity before and after the introduction of 
yardstick inspection when firms choose the status quo. Namely: 
][
,.. iquostatusiquostatus DiffEEffect = ,   (31) 
where ]0&1995|[]0&1995|[
,.
=>∆−=≤∆= ititititiquostatus ItWEItWEDiff  for each i . We also 
calculate these measures by groups. The results are shown in the last 12 rows in Table 5. 
 
The fifth row in Table 5 (the measure defined in equation (30)) shows that, in general, the 
welfare disparity from the full-information outcome widened after the introduction of yardstick 
inspection in 1995. Specifically, the welfare disparity widened by 8,954,000 yen, while the per-
household welfare disparity widened by 341.27 yen after 1995. Similar results are observed in 
all groups except group 12. If we compare the cases where firms kept the status quo (the 
measure defined in equation (31)), we again find that the welfare disparity widened after the 
introduction of yardstick inspection. Specifically, as shown in the 11th row, the welfare disparity 
widened by 9,215,000 yen, while the per-household welfare disparity widened by 385.63 yen 
after 1995. Again, similar results are observed in all groups except group 12. 
 
Because costs were decreasing during our sample period, keeping the status quo must have led 
to larger welfare disparity. Moreover, the higher the rate at which costs decrease, the larger the 
welfare disparity is when a firm keeps the status quo. Therefore, the above results of the larger 
welfare disparity after 1995 may merely reflect the higher rate of cost decrease in the period 
after 1995. However, the larger disparity after 1995 is observed even in the groups where the 
cost decrease rates are not significantly different between the periods before and after the 
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introduction of yardstick inspection (see Table 2 for the cost decrease rates). Therefore, our 
results may imply that the introduction of yardstick inspection reduced firms’ incentive to adjust 
prices. 
 
Why might firms have less incentive to adjust prices under yardstick inspection? This may be 
explained by firms’ collusive behavior. If a firm with decreased costs keeps the status quo, the 
benchmark cost will be kept high, while if it adjusts prices, the regulator will recognize lower 
costs and the benchmark cost will be reduced. Therefore, firms may have incentive to collude to 
keep the status quo. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This study is aimed at assessing the effect of yardstick inspection in the Japanese retail gas 
distribution industry. Realizing that yardstick inspection will lead the industry to the full-
information outcome if it works perfectly to eliminate the adverse selection problem, we infer 
its effect from the difference between the current and the hypothetical full-information welfare 
levels. 
 
We estimate a cost function for gas distributors under the assumption of asymmetric information 
between the regulator and the distributor for the efficient level of labor. It is assumed that the 
regulator does not observe either the inefficiency level or the effort level of each distributor. As 
the existing regulation has an incentive mechanism to induce the distributor’s effort, the 
distributor is assumed to maximize the utility with respect to the effort level. Therefore, the 
effort level can be solved as a function of the parameters. Using distributional assumption 
regarding the inefficiency level, maximum likelihood estimation is conducted to estimate the 
parameters, except the inefficiency level, and then, the inefficiency level is recovered by the 
method in Jondrow et al. (1982). It was shown that most distributors were quite efficient. 
Having obtained all the parameters, the welfare levels under the current and the full-information 
situations are calculated. Our results indicate that the welfare difference between the current and 
the full-information outcomes is somewhat reduced by yardstick inspection on average, 
implying that the inspection reduced firms’ incentive to report higher costs. 
 
Yardstick inspection was introduced in 1995. In that year, all the firms were required to report 
their costs for comparison. Since then, only the firms that apply for a price change are subject to 
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inspection and the most recent costs of the other firms (which do not apply for a price rise and 
do not report costs) are used as the benchmark. Our results show that the initial inspection in 
1995 reduced the welfare discrepancy, while the later individual cases did not. This may give 
rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, such that subsequent inspection cannot 
be effective for a firm that has learned the relative position of its cost. Furthermore, the 
inspection seems to have discouraged firms from changing prices. Our results from this study 
suggest that a better form of regulation, which takes into account firms’ dynamic incentive, 
should be considered. 
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Appendix I 
We show that if the slope of the inverse demand curve is smaller than the average cost curve, 
reporting a higher inefficiency level θˆ  leads to a lower regulated price and higher output.  
 
As in equation (19), the regulator set the regulated price so that : 
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The left side of the above inequality is the slope of the inverse demand curve and the right side 
is the slope of the average cost curve. Therefore, if the slope of the inverse demand curve is 
smaller than the average cost curve, reporting a higher inefficiency level θˆ  leads to a lower 
regulated price and higher output.  
 
We confirmed that, with our estimated parameter values, inequality (30) indeed holds in all the 
markets of our observation for a broad range of output level.17  
 
Appendix  B 
In this appendix, we show that current welfare )ˆ,( θθcW is a monotonically decreasing function 
of θˆ .  
 
                                                    
17
 Specifically, we have checked the range from the half to the double of the current output level.  
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Differentiating equation (24) byθˆ , we obtain the following: 
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But we know, from Appendix A, that 0
ˆ
<
θd
dY
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ˆ
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The value of the left hand side of the above inequality )(YΦ depends on the level ofY . With our 
parameter values, we graphically confirmed that )(YΦ  is always positive for all Y such 
that )(θYY < . 18  That is, 0
ˆ
)ˆ(
<
θ
θ
d
dW for all Y such that )(θYY < : welfare is monotonically 
decreasing in θˆ  for the level of Y such that )(θYY ≤ .19  
                                                    
18
 The graphs are available from the author upon request. 
19
 Because Appendix A shows that reporting higher θˆ decreases Y, we only need to consider the range of 
Y such that )(θYY < . 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Production 
type 
 Output 
( 3m ) 
Total cost 
(1000 yen) 
Labor price 
(1000 yen) 
Material price 
(1000 yen) 
Gas price 
(1000 yen/ 3m ) 
Capital 
(m) 
Consumer price 
(yen/ 3m ) 
Capital cost 
(1000 yen) 
Number 
of firms 
1 Mean 9129486 673577 6869 14.825 0.0443 249432 112.414 136842 59 
 s.d. 14400000 949049 1433 10.069 0.0055 262417 26.263 96701  
2 Mean 16400000 1681445 6990 20.114 0.0347 494968 152.705 1051975 21 
 s.d. 44000000 4198267 1424 9.413 0.0067 1112475 19.472 383928  
3 Mean 15400000 1892904 7053 18.645 0.0355 848017 170.820 387286 3 
 s.d. 13700000 1568506 1457 8.999 0.0065 615647 12.212 446240  
Total Mean 11100000 966965 6906 16.248 0.0418 334483 124.608 180327 76 
 s.d. 25000000 2262789 1432 10.125 0.0072 616029 31.346 545884  
Note: Production type 1 includes those without vaporization systems or reformers. Type 2 includes those with vaporization systems. Type 3 includes those with 
reformers. 
The total number of firms is larger than the sum of the number of firms in each production type because some distributors switched their production type during the 
sample period. 
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 Table 2: Cost and Price before and after the introduction of yardstick 
   Average operating cost 
(yen) 
 Price 
(yen) 
 Annual growth rate of 
average operating cost 
(%) 
Group Period  Before After   Before After   Before After  
Mean  129.65 120.57 ***  152.65 151.39   -0.780 -0.284  Group 12 
S.D.  23.83 20.56   24.71 25.95   0.851 0.896  
Mean  82.05 73.02 ***  105.87 101.77 ***  -0.191 -1.591  Group 13 
S.D.  26.31 14.89 ***  16.73 14.54 *  0.781 0.523 * 
Mean  82.96 77.86 ***  101.66 97.99   0.467 -1.239 * Group 14 
S.D.  12.00 14.48 *  16.22 13.95   0.585 0.453  
Mean  86.81 83.18   123.00 124.05   -2.453 -1.951  Group 15 
S.D.  6.16 24.57 ***  5.22 20.37 ***  1.084 1.714 * 
Total Mean  92.21 82.24 ***  115.12 109.69 ***  -0.244 -1.310 * 
 S.D.  29.55 23.47 ***  26.61 25.34   0.466 0.346  
Note: The differences of means and standard deviations are tested by T-test and F-test, respectively. Stars refer 
to the significance. * = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and *** = significant at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Parameter estimates of the cost function 
Type of model  Asymmetric information case  Standard case 
parameter  Estimate Standard error  Estimate Standard error 
α  
 45.313 31.5122    
0β   0.0722 0.0085    
Lβ   0.2497 0.0187  0.1000 0.0287 
Gβ   0.4421 0.0205  0.6580 0.0308 
Kβ   0.1676 0.0098  0.1371 0.0148 
Yβ   0.7708 0.0077  0.7643 0.0117 
tβ   –0.0005 0.0155  –0.0005 0.0233 
µ  
 0.8445 0.4607    
ν  
 1.9648 0.2385    
cσ   0.1624 0.0922  0.1770 0.1025 
Log likelihood  251.2  236.0 
# of observations  754  754 
Note: Because we imposed homogeneity of degree one in input prices during the 
estimation, Mβ does not appear in the Table. 
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Table 4: Demand Estimation 
Log output Coefficient Standard error 
Log price -0.275 0.143 
Constant 16.005 0.708 
Fixed effect Yes 
Year dummy Yes 
Number of Observation 1046 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9696 
F-test (91, 954) 367.61 
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Table 5: Welfare disparity between current and full information 
outcome:  
Difference before and after the introduction of Yardstick 
 
Measure  
Per household  
(yen) 
Whole market 
(thousand yen) 
aveEffect   –26.40 (62.02) 5604 (682) 
simEffect   –127.51 (62.16) 3363 (372) 
indEffect   647.11 (143.18) 23700 (2142) 
afterbeforeEffect ,     
Total 341.27 (42.24) 8954 (285) 
Group 12 -19.47 (206.65) 297 (585) 
Group 13 448.35 (26.46) 5183 (197) 
Group 14 162.08 (48.95) 8857 (490) 
Group 15 1504.50 (76.82) 99300 (5236) 
quostatusEffect .     
Total 385.63 (48.97) 9215 (309) 
Group 12 -107.98 (245.21) -664 (667) 
Group 13 542.25 (28.48) 5664 (206) 
Group 14 197.37 (47.10) 9701 (519) 
Group 15 1527.86 (83.12) 98900 (5698) 
Note: Negative value implies reduction in incentive to report higher 
cost. Inside the parentheses are standard errors. 
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Figure 1: Grouping for yardstick inspection 
 
Private Gas Suppliers
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households in
market: more than
150,000
From wholesale
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without vaporization
system)
LNG satellite,
LPG air (with
only vaporization
system)
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reformer)
Hokkaido
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Group 11
Public Gas Suppliers
From wholesale
supplier (suppliers
without
vaporization
system)
LNG satellite, LPG
air (with only
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Petroleum
(suppliers with
reformer)
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Chubu
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Kyushu
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* The first column in each table shows the names of districts. 
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Figure 2: Recent average unit price of public firms 
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Figure 3: Inefficiency parameter and cost distortion 
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Figure 4: Reported and True Inefficiency Levels and Price and Output:  
With Inelastic Demand 
 
  
)ˆ(θY  )(θY  
b  
d  
P  
Y  
)(YP
 
θAC  
θˆAC  
a  
c  
)ˆ(θP  
)(θP  
))ˆ(Y(AC θθ  
